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Patrick Nolan
In August 2010 the Economist magazine featured on its front 
cover a mocked-up photo of the United Kingdom’s new 
prime minister, David Cameron, sporting a punk rock-style 
Union Jack mohawk. This reflected the promise of a new, 
radical approach to fiscal policy. As the Economist (2010) 
noted: ‘Britain has embarked on a great gamble. Sooner or 
later, many other rich-world countries will have to take it too.’
Fiscal Consolidation 
and Transforming 
Government  
in the United Kingdom
This article looks at the United 
Kingdom’s recent experiment with fiscal 
consolidation. It puts this consolidation 
into its historical and international context 
and assesses its strengths and weaknesses. 
It shows that over its first three years the 
Coalition government failed to create 
a fiscal policy framework that holds 
spending on a lower track. However, the 
June 2013 spending review (for the 2015–16 
fiscal year) and recent positioning of the 
opposition Labour Party indicate that a 
new approach to fiscal discipline may now 
be starting to take hold.
The context for fiscal consolidation
In May 2010 the United Kingdom formed 
its first coalition government since the 
Second World War. This government 
made rescuing the public finances its 
most important goal, with the coalition 
agreement giving deficit reduction 
precedence over all other measures. As 
the chief secretary to the Treasury, Danny 
Alexander, argued: ‘we made the decision 
to cut our cloth to reflect our means, and 
prove that we could be trusted to restore 
health to the public finances. Building that 
trust had two elements: firstly establishing 
numbers that people believed. And 
secondly coming up with a credible plan 
that we could deliver on’ (Alexander, 
2012).
The Coalition’s plan for fiscal 
consolidation has been widely debated. 
Yet many of these debates fail to put this 
fiscal policy into its international and 
historical context. This is important as 
data from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) (2013a) show that when they 
entered power in 2010 the Coalition faced 
real problems. The build-up of debt was 
especially significant and reflected both 
the global financial crisis and the pre-
existing tendency of governments to run 
structural deficits, with governments 
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running deficits and public debt 
increasing every year since 2001–02.1 The 
challenge is that, as Corrie, Nolan and 
Zuccollo showed, ‘the large majority of 
the current stock of debt is structural and 
so will not reduce with economic growth. 
Indeed, less than £45 billion of the total 
£1 trillion of public debt is purely cyclical. 
The remainder constitutes debt that will 
not be offset by the automatic stabilisers 
once growth returns’ (Corrie, Nolan and 
Zuccollo, 2013).
Data from the IMF’s Fiscal Monitor 
also show that the Coalition’s plans for 
deficit reduction to 2015  – a 5.6 percentage 
point reduction in the cyclically-adjusted 
primary deficit – are similar to the 
United States and just above the level of 
Australia and New Zealand. What stands 
out is the balance between expenditure 
cuts and revenue measures, with 75.2% 
of the consolidation occurring on the 
expenditure side. This is above the IMF 
average for developed countries of 51.7%, 
but is similar to that of Germany and 
below that of countries like Canada, 
Spain and New Zealand. Further, as the 
cyclically-adjusted deficit is expected 
to persist until 2016–17, gross debt will 
grow by a further 20.2 percentage points 
(reaching 99.7% of GDP) between 2010 
and 2015.
In historical terms, the consolidation 
means that by 2014–15 spending will be 
just above the level of 2008–09 spending 
in real terms. But this should be seen in 
the context of the increase in spending 
prior to 2010. Public expenditure 
statistical analysis data released by HM 
Treasury show that between 2002–03 and 
2010–11 the government’s total managed 
expenditure increased in real terms from 
£521 billion to £704 billion. This was 
equivalent to a real increase of 35.0%, or 
an average annual increase of 3.8%. Even 
with the planned fiscal consolidation, 
by 2014–15 total spending will be 33.2% 
higher, transfers will be 55.1% higher and 
departmental spending will be 16.8% 
higher than in 2002–03. This is equivalent 
to average annual increases of 2.4%, 3.7% 
and 1.3% respectively.
The Coalition’s approach
The first stage of the Coalition’s 
consolidation was the release of an 
emergency budget in early 2010. This 
included a fiscal mandate to achieve a 
cyclically-adjusted current balance by 
the end of a rolling, five-year forecast 
period, and for public sector net debt as 
a percentage of GDP to be falling by 2015–
16. Overall fiscal aggregates to achieve 
this fiscal mandate were then set. These 
aggregates were based on a target (which 
was not met) for 80% of consolidation 
to take place through spending cuts and 
were mostly based on those proposed 
by the previous Labour administration.2 
Following this, overall departmental 
expenditure limits were established 
and an independent Office for Budget 
Responsibility (OBR) was created to assess 
the government’s performance against its 
fiscal mandate and targets.
Later that year the government 
completed a spending review for 2010–
11 to 2014–15. This translated overall 
departmental expenditure limits into 
individual departmental settlements. Yet 
not all departments faced a reduction in 
their budgets and the National Health 
Service (NHS), Overseas Development 
Assistance (ODA) and school budgets 
were protected. As well as these 
departmental budgets, the basic state 
pension was uprated in a more generous 
manner (a triple guarantee of earnings, 
prices or 2.5%) and the prime minister, 
David Cameron, ruled out cuts to a 
number of universal pensioner benefits. 
This contrasted with the treatment of 
other groups, with students and younger 
families losing support (including the 
significant decision to means-test the 
child benefit) (Nolan, 2011a).
In June 2013 the Coalition completed 
a further spending review for the 2015–16 
year, which will come into effect one 
month before the next general election. 
Table 1: Fiscal challenges facing the Coalition (share of GDP)
2006 (%) 2010 (%)
Tax revenue 37.7 36.6
Expenditure 40.5 46.7
Cyclically-adjusted primary balance (excluding debt repayments) –3.1 –6.0
Cyclically-adjusted overall balance –4.7 –8.6
Gross debt 43.0 79.4
Source: IMF (2013a)
Table 2: Fiscal consolidation in selected countries, 2010–15
Change in 
revenue, 
2010–15
Change in 
expenditure, 
2010–15
Change in 
cyclically- 
adjusted 
primary 
balance, 
2010–15
Change in 
gross debt, 
2010–15
Share of 
consolidation 
through 
expenditure 
reductions 
(%)
United Kingdom 1.1 –3.4 5.6 20.2 75.2
New Zealand 0.1 –5.3 5.0 4.7 97.6
Australia 2.8 –2.2 5.0 4.6 44.2
Canada 0.6 –2.9 2.9 0.0 82.0
France 3.2 –1.3 3.9 11.8 29.7
Germany 1.1 –3.0 3.3 –6.8 73.1
Spain 0.0 –3.0 5.2 40.3 98.5
United States 3.8 –3.2 5.6 10.2 46.1
Developed- 
country average 2.3 –2.5 4.2 7.2 51.7
Source: IMF (2013a)
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As with the previous spending review, the 
budgets for the NHS, ODA and schools 
were protected. However, a larger share 
of the NHS budget was made available 
to local authorities (thus breaking the 
ring fence in practice if not in principle) 
and efforts were made to reduce the 
cost of pensioner benefits. In particular, 
it was proposed to restrict access to the 
winter fuel payment (to reduce take-up 
by expatriate pensioners in European 
countries outside the United Kingdom), 
and pensioner benefits excluding the state 
pension were included in a budgetary cap 
on transfer spending.
OBR data show that in cash terms the 
Coalition kept its spending plans broadly 
on track (Corrie, Nolan and Zuccollo, 
2013). Yet, while there was little deviation 
from the overall cash path, lower than 
expected economic growth meant that 
the Coalition failed to satisfy its fiscal 
rules. In this respect the Coalition has not 
been unusual, as this has very much been 
the pattern of successive governments. 
As Zuccollo (2012) noted, for the past 
decade governments have been living 
by the idiom that ‘rules are made to be 
broken’.3 There was also a significant 
change in the composition of the 
planned consolidation, with higher than 
expected spending on transfers (annually 
managed expenditure) being offset by 
deeper cuts in departmental budgets 
(departmental expenditure limits). This 
increased spending on transfers reflected 
both higher debt servicing costs and 
higher welfare spending, although much 
of this increase in welfare spending was 
structural (e.g., increasing spending on 
pensions) and cannot be attributed to 
the economic cycle (Corrie, Nolan and 
Zuccollo, 2013).
The austerity debates
The Coalition’s fiscal consolidation has 
(unsurprisingly) been the topic of intense 
debate (Nolan, 2012). Supporters of the 
Coalition’s plans have argued that these 
changes were necessary to signal fiscal 
discipline, allow the government’s costs 
of borrowing to fall, and support growth 
through allowing interest rates to remain 
low (Lilico, Holmes and Sameen, 2009). 
They have also (more recently) argued 
that any easing of fiscal policy may lead 
to monetary authorities beginning to 
tighten sooner, thus increasing interest 
rates. Indeed, it has been suggested that 
to support further growth the Bank of 
England’s monetary policy mandate 
requires review rather than easing of fiscal 
policy (Osborne, 2013).4
Critics have, in contrast, argued 
that reduced government spending has 
weakened private demand, and that this is 
especially concerning given the weakness 
of the eurozone (the United Kingdom’s 
most important trading partner). It has 
also been argued that if one-off policy 
changes (such as the increase in the 
standard rate of the value added tax 
(VAT)) and non-tradeables are stripped 
out of the figures, then underlying 
inflationary pressures are weak and so the 
likelihood of monetary policy offsetting 
an easing of fiscal policy is low. Finally, 
it has been claimed that with the low cost 
of government borrowing (possibly due 
to non-conventional monetary policy 
and a weak outlook for growth), debt-
financed short-term stimulus could come 
at a relatively low cost and may help to 
circumvent blockages in the financial 
system (Nolan, 2012).
Yet the differences between these two 
camps should not be overstated. Both 
sides agree on the need for a plan to reduce 
borrowing to avoid losing the confidence 
of markets. The differences are largely 
ones of timing. Further, both camps have 
weaknesses in their positions. For example, 
supporters of fiscal consolidation need 
to recognise that this involves a trade-
off between short-term economic costs 
and long-term gain, and that, as Reform 
warned in June 2010, reconciling this 
trade-off ‘will not be pain free’ (Bassett, 
Cawston et al., 2010); while supporters 
of easing fiscal policy need to recognise 
that ‘multiplier analysis’ provides a much 
weaker case than commonly assumed for 
consumption spending funded by debt 
(Haldenby et al., 2011).
The Coalition made a mistake in 
understating the likely costs of fiscal 
consolidation. This reflected a failure 
to fully grasp the scale of the changes 
required. It was expected that much of 
the heavy lifting could be done through 
reducing waste or administrative 
costs. While making government and 
administration work better is important, 
making cost savings on the scale needed 
required going beyond incremental 
improvements. As Ruth Richardson said 
in a speech in London in September 2010, 
based on her experience in New Zealand, 
‘salami slicing, waste busting media 
stunts, public servant or special adviser 
elephant hunting are just exercises that 
fiddle at the fringes. The real meat lies 
in asking the fundamental question – 
does the government have a role at all?’ 
(Richardson, 2010). By 2013 the National 
Audit Office had begun to raise similar 
concerns and noted that there has been 
insufficient emphasis on delivery of 
long-term changes and improvement 
in efficiency necessary to make savings 
sustainable. As they highlighted, 
departments still tend to lack a clear 
strategic vision of what they are to do, 
what they are not, and the most cost-
effective way of delivering it (National 
Audit Office, 2013).
Many supporters of short-term 
stimulus spending also failed to consider 
how its economic impact depends on 
the type and not just level of spending. 
International evidence suggests that 
the return from spending on economic 
development (such as infrastructure) 
tends to be higher than from spending 
on social protection (such as welfare 
and health) (Gemmell, Kneller and 
Many supporters of 
short-term stimulus 
spending also failed 
to consider how its 
economic impact 
depends on the type 
and not just level of 
spending.
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Sanz, 2009). As the current secretary of 
state for business, innovation and skills, 
Vince Cable, wrote while in opposition: 
‘Without fiscal consolidation it will not 
be possible to remedy the current gross 
imbalance in the economy. Without 
infrastructure investment there will not 
be a functioning, modern, sustainable, 
“green” economy for the next generation 
to work with’ (Cable, 2009). Yet, as the 
House of Commons Public Accounts 
Committee (2013) showed, the pattern 
of consolidation has been the opposite 
of this. Low-value spending such as the 
poorly-targeted pensioners’ winter fuel 
payments, free TV licences and bus passes 
should have been cut first, but instead the 
earliest cuts fell relatively heavily on areas 
like capital spending.5
Failing to get a grip on long-term spending
The need for fiscal consolidation does 
not just reflect immediate factors like the 
fallout from the global financial crisis. 
With the ageing of the population, the 
proportion of people who work and pay 
the taxes that fund services and transfers 
(largely funded on a pay-as-you-go basis) 
is falling (Nolan, Thorpe and Trewhitt, 
2012). This reflects not only a bulge in the 
population reaching retirement age but 
also increasing longevity. Indeed, as Nolan 
(2013b) has shown, a person retiring in 
2010 would have a one-in-six chance of 
spending three decades in retirement; 
by 2035 a quarter of people retiring can 
expect at least 30 years of retirement. This 
is even with current plans to increase the 
state pension age. This means major areas 
of government spending require reform, 
especially pensions and health.
Yet the Coalition has been reluctant 
to reduce spending in these two areas. 
This is like trying to rescue the public 
finances with one hand tied behind your 
back. To illustrate the importance of these 
two budgets: if the Coalition reformed 
them so that they remained fixed in cash 
terms, the increase in total spending from 
2011–12 to 2014–15 would be 55.1% less. 
The increase in health spending alone 
is equivalent to 22.5% of the increase in 
total spending from 2011–12 to 2014–15 
(Corrie, Nolan and Zuccollo, 2013). The 
overall result is like putting the public 
finances on a crash diet which actually 
reduces the chances of long-term weight 
loss. There is a perception that services are 
being underfunded, while the real drivers 
of spending have been left untouched.
The growing power of the elderly 
voting bloc has proven to be a major 
constraint on pension reform. As Corrie 
and Nolan (2013) showed, around one 
quarter of all voters were over 65 in the 
last general election and this proportion 
is expected to grow every election to reach 
one in three by 2050. It is important to 
think about reducing the long-term costs 
of pensions, yet recent government policy 
has gone in the other direction. Although 
the Coalition brought forward a planned 
increase in the retirement age, this was 
offset by the change in the way that the 
state pension increases over time. The 
state pension will increase by the highest 
of earnings, the consumer price index 
or 2.5% (the so-called triple lock) and 
this change alone will add around 0.7% 
of GDP to the cost of pensions by 2040 
(Cawston et al., 2011).
Yet a recent change in the position 
of the opposition Labour Party towards 
universal benefits and the Coalition’s 2013 
spending review have shown that the 
desire to get to grips with spending on 
pensions is growing. The Labour Party has 
proposed means-testing the winter fuel 
payment (this has been a long-standing 
position of the Liberal Democrat deputy 
prime minister, Nick Clegg) and the 2013 
spending review included a proposal to 
withdraw this payment from expatriate 
pensioners living in other European 
countries (based on a temperature test). 
A cap on the overall level of spending on 
welfare transfers has also been proposed 
by the Coalition, and both it and the 
opposition have signalled that this cap 
will include pensioner benefits. The 
Coalition’s current position is, however, 
to exclude the state pension from this 
cap, which will mean its coverage is so 
narrow as to be practically meaningless. 
In 2013–14 pensioners will receive 54% of 
all welfare spending and tax credits, and 
the state pension alone will account for 
75% of these pensioner benefits.
The Coalition has also failed to get 
to grips with the NHS budget. Again 
this partly reflects the concerns of the 
elderly voting bloc: Corrie and Nolan 
(2013) show that the NHS accounts for 
95% of all spending on benefits in kind 
on the average retired household. Yet the 
Coalition’s approach of ring-fencing the 
NHS budget has reduced the pressure to 
innovate and meant that the squeeze on 
areas of related spending, such as adult 
social care, has had to be deeper (Cawston 
et al., 2013). The ring fence has worked 
against the integration of services and the 
need to shift care from the acute setting 
into the community and the home.
The Coalition appears to have 
recognised problems with the health ring 
Table 3: The importance of the health, welfare and education budgets
Total managed expenditure (2014, £ billions) 733.5
Spending on health, welfare and education (2014, £ billions) 380.1
Share of total 2014–15 spending of health, welfare and education (%) 53.3
Share of increase in spending (2011–12 to 2014–15) of health, welfare 
and education (%) 55.1
Share of increase in spending (2011–12 to 2014–15) of health (%) 22.5
Source: Corrie, Nolan and Zuccollo (2013)
It is important to think 
about reducing the 
long-term costs of 
pensions, yet recent 
government policy 
has gone in the other 
direction.
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fence and in the 2013 spending review 
extended a policy where NHS funds can 
be used by local authorities to integrate 
care. Having a funding pool that allows 
resources to cross departmental boundaries 
and to go where they will have the best 
impact on the community is sensible, and 
is similar to the justice sector fund in New 
Zealand. Yet this architecture will require 
a greater focus on joint working – among 
Cabinet ministers, departmental chief 
executives and throughout their agencies. 
Without further progress on civil service 
reform, it is hard to be confident that 
the joint fund for health integration 
will change outcomes in the way hoped. 
The Coalition government has failed to 
properly grasp the importance of civil 
service reform (Haldenby, Majumdar 
and Rosen, 2013) and the joint fund risks 
being another source of tension rather 
than transforming the way government 
works.
The Coalition government has 
also failed to grasp the importance of 
reforming the way in which the NHS is 
funded. For decades real reform of the 
funding of the service has remained off 
the agenda and emphasis has instead 
been given to reorganising the service 
to improve resource use. Improving 
resource use is important, but the narrow 
basis for funding the NHS means it 
is out of step with the mainstream of 
international practice and is vulnerable 
to the pressure on public finances from 
population ageing. On average, OECD 
countries spend 2.7% of GDP on private 
healthcare, while in the United Kingdom 
this is just 1.6% (Nolan, 2013a).
The need for revenue measures
While the bulk of the fiscal consolidation 
has taken place on the spending side, the 
Coalition has sought to make changes on 
the revenue side too. Yet there appears to 
have been little recognition that the re-
quirement for greater revenue (as a share 
of GDP) is not just a short-term phenom-
enon. There is a view that once the crisis 
is over it will be possible to significantly 
reduce taxation, yet OBR data show that 
public sector current receipts are expected 
to average 38.2% of GDP for the next 20 
years, while total managed expenditure 
is expected to average 39.9% (Office for 
Budget Responsibility, 2012). There is no 
fiscal headroom for lowering tax burdens 
without also going significantly further on 
entitlement reform.
It could be argued that this is a 
static view of taxation and that tax 
relief can, at least partly, fund itself. 
Yet the priorities in current tax policy 
do not satisfy this test of expanding 
the tax base and generating additional 
revenue. In particular, a major priority 
of the Coalition has been to increase 
the personal income tax allowance. This 
comes at a large revenue loss, and does 
little for the overall efficiency and fairness 
of the income tax system as the bulk of 
the relief goes to people above the level 
of the allowance (Nolan, 2011b). For 
most people this tax relief has an impact 
only on already-earned income and does 
not improve the return from additional 
work. It also increases incentives for tax 
avoidance and evasion, and reflects an 
approach to tax policy that has been 
criticised in the United States by the 
supply-side economist Art Laffer. As 
Laffer noted: ‘I’ve never said all tax cuts 
pay for themselves’ (Fox, 2007).
The Coalition’s approach to 
business taxation has been described 
as ‘schizophrenic’. On the one hand it 
has reduced the main rate of company 
taxation in an effort to create the most 
competitive tax regime in the G20. On 
the other it has introduced ad hoc taxes 
on important sectors of the economy, 
such as banking (Bassett, Haldenby et 
al., 2010), and attacked legitimate efforts 
by corporations to reduce their tax bills. 
As John Cridland, director general of the 
Confederation of British Industry, has 
noted: ‘That confusion of purpose – are 
we making the UK more tax competitive? 
Are we sending signals that somehow 
big business can’t be trusted? – needs 
reconciling’ (Rowley, 2013). Further, 
contrary to the political rhetoric, around 
half of the tax gap can be attributed 
to small-to-medium enterprises, and 
Coalition policies are encouraging 
these businesses to plan their affairs 
to avoid tax.6 By cutting company tax 
rates and increasing personal allowances 
while making the tax system more 
hostile towards higher income earners, 
the Coalition is getting its tax design 
wrong (with increasingly variable rates 
encouraging tax planning). The entire 
Table 4: The long-term fiscal outlook – receipts and managed expenditure (share of GDP)
2010–
11
(%)
2020–
21
2030-
31
2040–
41
2050–
51
2060–
61
Public sector current receipts 37.3 38.2 38.4 38.9 38.9 39.1
Total managed expenditure 46.5 38.8 40.1 41.6 42.7 45.0
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility (2012)
In 2010, when the 
spending review 
was launched, a 
spokesperson from 
HM Treasury said: 
‘Anyone who thinks 
the review is just 
about saving money 
is missing the point. 
This is a once-in-a-
generation opportunity 
to transform the way 
that government 
works’ ...
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system needs to be simpler and less open 
to abuse.
It is also important not to confuse 
tax rates with tax revenue, and rather 
than raising tax rates emphasis should 
go on strengthening the tax base. As 
Reform (Bassett, Haldenby, et al., 2010), 
the OECD (Holmes, 2010), the Mirrlees 
Review (Mirrlees et al., 2011) and the 
IMF (2013b) among others have noted, 
the major opportunity for improving the 
tax base is to close holes in the indirect 
tax (particularly the VAT) system. The 
expensive system of pension tax relief 
is another potential area for reform 
(Cawston et al., 2011). Yet the Coalition has 
ruled out a significant expansion of the 
VAT tax base and has, in fact, performed 
an embarrassing policy reversal on the 
extension of VAT to hot takeaway food 
(dubbed ‘pasty-gate’ in the media). On 
pension tax relief, while this is an area 
that clearly requires reform, the approach 
taken has been largely designed according 
to political principles and failed to be a 
coherent package that increases saving 
and lowers costs to taxpayers.
Conclusion
In 2010, when the spending review was 
launched, a spokesperson from HM 
Treasury said: ‘Anyone who thinks the 
review is just about saving money is 
missing the point. This is a once-in-a-
generation opportunity to transform 
the way that government works’ (Daily 
Telegraph, 2010). Yet the Coalition has 
failed to achieve this vision. This has 
been partly, but not wholly, an own 
goal. By focusing on short-term political 
priorities rather than long-term reform, 
the Coalition has made its task even 
harder. There are emerging signs that this 
approach may be changing, but concerns 
remain.
The Coalition failed to properly 
capitalise on its opportunities over the 
last three years and it must not waste 
the final two years of this Parliament. 
Two key things must happen. First, the 
Coalition must illustrate that there is no 
simple relationship between spending 
money and improving outcomes. 
Debates in the United Kingdom are 
heavily biased towards a focus on inputs, 
such as scorecards of how individual 
budgets have moved up or down. As the 
experience in areas such as police reform 
show, it is possible to reduce inputs and 
improve outcomes (May, 2013). But this is 
only possible with reforms that improve 
the productivity of spending.
Second, the Coalition must give 
greater attention to the role of civil 
service reform in fiscal consolidation. 
As Ruth Richardson wrote, ongoing 
fiscal prudence requires ‘a results-driven 
and accountable public sector … a clear 
idea of what we wanted to achieve and 
… to organise services to achieve these 
priorities’ (Richardson, 2010). On this 
there are, as the current paymaster general, 
Francis Maude, has noted, important 
lessons that the United Kingdom could 
learn from New Zealand (Lodge et al., 
2013). The close relationship between 
New Zealand’s State Sector Act 1988 and 
Public Finance Act 1989, along with the 
later Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994, has 
been reflected in a strong approach to 
managing budgets, making departments 
account for their assets and reporting 
performance. Ensuring that the civil 
service is more clearly held to account for 
contributing to governments’ fiscal policy 
objectives is essential if the Coalition is to 
achieve its mission of doing more with 
less.
1 As Zuccollo (2012) noted, ‘measures of the sustainability 
of the UK government debt show a long history of 
unsustainable borrowing: the surplus has been great enough 
to [sustainably] reduce public debt in only six of the past 34 
years.’
2 The Coalition proposals were for an additional consolidation 
of £40 billion per year by 2014–15, which was composed 
of £8 billion a year from net tax increases and £32 billion 
a year from spending reductions. This is in the context of 
total discretionary planned consolidation of £113 billion 
by 2014–15 (thus, Coalition plans represented 35% of 
the total). In comparison to the Coalition’s 80:20 goal, the 
previous Labour administration proposed that spending 
measures would contribute 71% of consolidation and 
revenue measures 29% (Corrie, Nolan and Zuccollo, 2013).
3 From 1998 to 2008 the UK had two rules: a golden rule to 
ensure budget balance and a sustainable investment rule to 
constrain total debt. These rules did not prevent the increase 
in government debt in the UK between 2003 and 2008, 
even before the global financial crisis (Zuccollo, 2012).
4 Supporters of the Coalition’s plans have also emphasised 
the need to distinguish the UK from the eurozone. While the 
experience of eurozone countries is often cited as an example 
of self-defeating austerity, unlike these countries the UK 
has its own currency and an independent monetary policy, 
which can potentially lean against changes in spending and 
taxation.
5 It is important to not overstate the economic benefits of 
infrastructure spending. While infrastructure can play an 
important part in lifting the long-run growth potential of the 
economy, this depends on selecting the right projects and 
funding arrangements (see, for example, Haldenby et al., 
2012).
6 The tax gap is the difference between the tax collected and 
the theoretical liability (amount that should be collected). 
The estimated tax gap for 2009–10 was around 8% of total 
revenues. Inaccurate returns from individuals and indirect 
taxes like VAT made up the biggest proportion of the tax 
gap. The share of the tax gap which could be attributed to 
corporation tax, especially of large and very large businesses, 
was relatively small (Nolan, 2011b).
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